I Introduction
In January 2001, Canada's federal government put in place an important new component of data protection law: the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).
1 PIPEDA regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information within the private sector. This act takes its place alongside the federal Privacy Act and Access to Information Act, 2 which regulate the public sector, together creating a fairly comprehensive federal regime of data protection and implementing what have come to be known internationally as 'fair information practices.' Fair information practices involve a number of core entitlements that seek to place limits on information processing practices as well as to ensure the transparency and accountability of these practices. Within this model of data protection, privacy is often seen as the core interest protected and individual consent as the central vehicle through which this protection is accomplished. This certainly characterizes the rhetoric surrounding PIPEDA. Initially, PIPEDA applied only to the federally regulated private sector as well as to organizations engaged in collecting, using, or disclosing information outside of the province or country. However, PIPEDA's staggered implementation schedule was completed as of January 2004, and it now also applies to all organizations engaged in commercial activity within a province, unless that province has enacted 'substantially similar' legislation. 3 To date, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta have all enacted legislation that has been deemed substantially similar. 4 This article argues that two of these initiatives raise interesting questions about the relationship between consent and privacy and suggest that derogations from consent are not necessarily derogations from privacy. That is, they call into question the claimed centrality of consent to fair information practices and the data protection regimes modelled upon them.
The privacy legislation of both British Columbia and Alberta permits employers to collect, use, and disclose personal information about employees without employee consent so long as employees are notified prior to the collection, use, and disclosure and 'the collection [and use and disclosure] is reasonable for the purposes of establishing, managing or terminating an employment relationship between the organization and the individual.'
5 When first introduced, these provisions received strong criticism from some privacy advocates. For example, former privacy commissioner George Radwanski argued that the BC Act 'is clearly inferior' to PIPEDA with respect to protecting employee privacy and that the 'reasonable' test that the act does provide is 'meager consolation for employees or prospective employees concerned about privacy.'
6 Nonetheless, these acts have been found to provide 'substantially similar' protection to that of PIPEDA, although the basis for this finding in relation to employee privacy has not been articulated. The most straightforward reason would be that even if PIPEDA applied to activity within the provinces of BC and Alberta, it would not apply to employees but only to commercial activities; PIPEDA applies to employee information only within the federally regulated sector. 7 In other words, the BC and Alberta Acts provide privacy protection for employees superior to that of PIPEDA because PIPEDA applies only to a narrow category of employees. A much different reason would be that the kind of privacy protection that PIPEDA offers to employees in federally regulated industries is equivalent to the privacy protection offered to employees generally under the BC and Alberta Acts. According to this line of reasoning, a regime of notice and reasonableness provides the same level of privacy protection as a regime of notice, reasonableness, and consent.
This article argues that this second line of reasoning is in fact persuasive. Moreover, it argues that this line of reasoning is persuasive even outside the employment relationship. Its central claim is that the alleged centrality of consent to the protection of privacy is misplaced: all derogations from consent are not necessarily derogations from privacy.
A number of reasons support this claim. First, while consent-based privacy regimes are attractive in terms of both the individual empowerment they seem to provide and the manner in which they appear to evade the definitional difficulties that plague other regimes, they suffer from a number of important defects. These defects, enumerated in subsequent sections of this article, suggest that individual consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for the adequate protection of privacy. Therefore, there are strong theoretical reasons for scepticism about any claims for the centrality of consent to the protection of privacy. Second, a close examination of several articulations of fair information practices suggests that consent is not the only norm operating to limit the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. Some of these other norms, such as the 'reasonable purpose' standard included within PIPEDA, can potentially offer a great deal of privacy protection. Third, the decisions rendered under PIPEDA so far in fact confirm the conceptual primacy of reasonableness over consent. In these cases, where individuals are properly notified regarding the purposes for the collection of their personal information and that collection is found to be reasonable, a finding of consent follows; in other words, it is the test for 'reasonable purposes' and not the consent provisions that drives the analysis. This suggests that it is 'reasonable purposes' that holds out the most promise for strong privacy protection and is therefore deserving of much greater attention from the privacy community.
However, this article also argues that the decisions under PIPEDA indicate that the promise of 'reasonable purposes' to protect privacy remains largely unfulfilled. If consent is seen as providing central protection for privacy, then 'reasonable purposes' too easily becomes a site for the consideration of countervailing values, such as business interests. In this way, misunderstanding the relative roles of consent and reasonable purposes threatens to undermine privacy rather than protect it. What is needed instead is a shift in focus away from consent and toward a more nuanced and normative approach to privacy that is then incorporated into a test for 'reasonable purposes.' A regime of privacy protection centred around individual consent, particularly in the context of e-commerce, is attractive for a number of reasons. It has the potential to shift the balance of power away from businesses that have strong reasons to collect personal information toward the individuals who might have strong reasons to prevent this. In this way, a baseline entitlement to consent can give individuals greater bargaining power within the market to force businesses to be more responsive to privacy. Indeed, PIPEDA was introduced, in part, as one prong of the federal government's E-Com Strategy, responding to consumer concerns that shopping online put their privacy at risk. 8 But a consent-based privacy regime is attractive for reasons beyond its perceived individual empowerment. Another attraction, less obvious to consumers but important for legal policy, is that such regimes appear to avoid some of the definitional difficulties surrounding the idea of privacy. Privacy is a notoriously elusive concept, and adequately defining it has been one of the central problems plaguing any legal regime purporting to protect it. For example, after surveying the extensive American experience with the tort of invasion of privacy, William Prosser famously argued that the tort protected not one but four separate interests and should be considered as four separate actions.
9 This is indeed how the tort is currently treated in American law; there is no general tort of invasion of privacy but rather intrusions upon seclusion, publication of private facts, false light publicity, and misappropriation of name or likeness.
10 Such difficulties in defining privacy within tort law have led some other jurisdictions to reject recognition of such a tort, confining the protection of privacy to what may be accomplished under breach of confidentiality.
11 Canada occupies a middle ground, with a few lowercourt decisions endorsing the recognition of the tort, 12 others embracing privacy under the rubric of nuisance law, 13 and a few provinces creating a statute-based tort. The definitional difficulties that plague private law are also present in constitutional jurisprudence regarding privacy. Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms 15 has been held to protect a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.' However, this test suffers from an important ambiguity resulting from the fact that 'reasonable' refers to two very different kinds of inquiries with respect to privacy. 16 One sense of 'reasonable' refers to the outcome of a balancing of privacy with other interests, such as law enforcement. This is the sense in which 'reasonable' is invoked in the first major Charter decision interpreting s. 8: Hunter v. Southam. 17 There is a point at which an individual's privacy interest must give way to other important state interests. Hunter v. Southam held that, in the context of law enforcement, that point was articulated by the standard of reasonable and probable cause. The second sense of 'reasonable' refers to the threshold question of whether a sufficient privacy interest is at stake to engage the Charter. This threshold question is therefore unconcerned with the question of the interests that might weigh against privacy in a particular context and instead asks about the nature of the privacy interest at stake.
Although the threshold question and the balancing question are distinct, the jurisprudence is replete with examples where the two have been conflated. This is problematic when considerations of the kinds of interests that might outweigh privacy in some contexts are invoked in order to define the nature of the privacy interest at stake in the threshold analysis. In this way, privacy is discounted prior to the balancing exercise, where those countervailing interests are properly considered. This 'double-counting' of the interests that are to balance against privacy, then, has the very real potential to undermine privacy protection.
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Another important defect of the reasonable expectation of privacy test is that it is often interpreted as a kind of descriptive inquiry into social expectations of privacy rather than a normative, purposive inquiry into why privacy is important in a free and democratic society and how those values are engaged in any particular context. That is, instead of asking whether surreptitious video cameras in hotel rooms are consistent with a free and democratic society, many judges instead ask, ' 20 Even in cases where a more normative approach may be discerned, what is appealed to are a confusing mix of norms arising out of considerations such as property, bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and confidentiality, with little analysis linking these strands together.
21
These definitional difficulties present in legal regimes protecting privacy are present in the literature regarding privacy as well. In pointing to the general lament of theorists regarding the ability to reach a satisfying account of privacy, Daniel Solove notes that privacy definitions currently encompass '(among other things) freedom of thought, control over one's body, solitude in one's home, control over information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, protection of one's reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations.'
22 This is not a recent phenomenon. More than twenty years ago, Ruth Gavison surveyed the terrain and argued that various accounts of privacy have included practices as various as the collection, storage, and computerization of information; the dissemination of information about individuals; intruding or entering 'private' places; drawing attention to individuals; required testing of individuals; and forced disclosure of information.… exposure to unpleasant noises, smells and sights; prohibitions of such conduct as abortions, use of contraceptives, and 'unnatural' sexual intercourse; insulting, harassing, or persecuting behaviour; presenting individuals in a 'false light'; unsolicited mail and unwanted phone calls; regulation of the way familial obligations should be discharged; and commercial exploitation.
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It is difficult to offer a theory or definition that can coherently account for the inclusion of such diverse practices under the rubric of privacy.
Given these difficulties, a consent-based privacy regime has much to recommend it. Such regimes often implicitly rely upon a definition of privacy as control over personal information; consent is the manner in which this control is operationalized. Many privacy advocates and theorists define privacy in precisely this way. For example, Alan Westin defines privacy as 'the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.' 24 Charles Fried has argued that privacy 'is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.' 25 One could therefore argue that a consent-based privacy regime clears away definitional difficulties by endorsing one particular definition.
Another way to characterize a consent-based privacy regime is to view it as a model of individual choice. According to this model, it is individuals who both define privacy for themselves and decide what level of privacy they wish to enjoy. In this way, this model does not depend upon a definition of privacy as control over information; an individual choice model would largely allow for a plurality of such definitions -each individual may choose not only according to his or her own privacy preference levels but also according to his or her own definition of privacy. Moreover, individuals make their own decisions with respect to the trade-off between privacy and other values.
A consent-based regime of privacy protection therefore appears to get beyond many of the definitional difficulties inherent in other types of privacy regimes by either implicitly endorsing a definition of privacy as control over personal information or leaving the question of definition up to the individual. Furthermore, according to both iterations of a consent-based regime, derogations from consent are derogations from privacy. If privacy is defined as control over personal information, then a lack of consent is easily construed as a lack of control and, therefore, a lack of privacy. Derogations from consent can still be generally understood as derogations from privacy if one moves from a privacy-as-control model to an individual-choice model. The only additional premise needed is the claim that, in those circumstances where consent is diminished, individuals would in fact have chosen to preserve their privacy rather than give it up; if they would choose to give it up, then there is the possibility that derogations from consent provide the same level of privacy protection. Both privacy-as-control and privacy-as-individualchoice therefore capture the pervasive view that consent is centrally linked to privacy protection. However, despite the promise of consent-based privacy regimes, the next section argues that there are in fact strong reasons to be sceptical of this claimed connection between consent and the protection of privacy. As will be outlined, the case can be made that derogations from consent are not necessarily derogations from privacy.
B THE CASE FOR SCEPTICISM
While the promise of consent-based approaches to privacy lies in their seeming ability to empower individuals within the marketplace as well as to circumvent problems regarding the definition of privacy, the case for scepticism is rooted in the many ways this individual empowerment remains elusive and these definitional problems reappear.
For example, control-based accounts of privacy are susceptible to a number of criticisms that show how they do not really overcome the definitional dilemma of privacy. One of their defects is that they cannot answer the question, Control over what? Without an answer to this question, we are left with the value of control itself, which would make privacy indistinguishable from liberty or autonomy. Instead, privacy must be defined in relation to what an individual is entitled to control rather than to the norm of control itself.
This concern lies at the root of two prevalent criticisms of controlbased theories of privacy: that control is neither necessary nor sufficient for the protection of privacy. 26 For example, W.A. Parent gives the example of an individual who 'invents a fantastic X-ray device,' allowing him to look through the walls of my home. I thereby lose control over the disclosure of information regarding the activities taking place within my home, even if nobody actually uses the X-ray device. 27 Nonetheless, my privacy is lost only if someone actually uses the X-ray to look into my home. Similarly, if I lose my personal diary and another finds it but does not read it and does not show it to anyone else, I might say that my privacy has been respected even though I have no control over my personal information. In this way, control is not a necessary condition for privacy; I may have no control over the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information yet still suffer no loss of privacy.
One might still want to point to Parent's example and argue that even if privacy is not lost until someone actually uses the X-ray, it is nonetheless threatened because it is subject to the whim of the X-ray inventor. But even here, a complete account of this threat cannot come from the idea of the control that the X-ray inventor has. That someone controls 28 I may also control access to my home, but this is an idea of property, not privacy. some aspect of my life is troubling -even wrong -but does not tell us why we should label that aspect 'privacy.' The fact that we consider the Xray device a threat to privacy rather than to some other value depends upon the sense of the privacy of the home that we already have, which operates in the example independently of the idea of control.
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But neither is control a sufficient condition for privacy. It is not sufficient because it seems plausible -indeed, persuasive -to argue that one can consent to give up one's privacy. 29 That is, if an individual consents to a request that her personal diary be published on the Internet, we would say that the individual has consented to give up her privacy. Privacy, therefore, appears to be a concept that is, in some fundamental manner, independent of the notion of consent. Similarly, as Gavison points out, we often want to criticize individuals for not choosing privacy. 30 If such a criticism turns out to be of the 'you should not have chosen to give up control over that' nature, then privacy looks more like autonomy, where we are concerned that adults make their own choices and retain the ability to do so. But if the criticism rests on a different understanding of impropriety than simply the giving up of control, then we need an account of this. In other words, we need a definition of privacy that can identify a loss of privacy independently of identifying a loss of control.
To argue that control is neither necessary nor sufficient for the protection of privacy is not to argue that the two are not in some way deeply connected. Privacy may in fact be well protected, in many instances, by giving individuals control over their information. Control may also protect other important and related values, such as autonomy. What this argument does suggest is that privacy is not adequately defined as control over information. And this suggestion opens the possibility that some derogations from a consent-based model of privacy protection do not actually represent a lower level of privacy protection.
The case for scepticism also holds once one moves from a privacy-ascontrol model to an individual-choice model. Although the connection between consent and privacy is less direct on this model, derogations from consent can still be generally understood as derogations from privacy. The only additional premise needed is the claim that in those Nonetheless, it is also important to note that these implied terms do not necessarily favour the employee's interest.
circumstances where consent is diminished that individuals would in fact have chosen to preserve their privacy rather than give it up; if they would choose to give it up, then there is the possibility that derogations from consent provide the same level of privacy protection. Assuming that the latter suggestion is unlikely, there are nonetheless two major difficulties with an individual-choice model of privacy protection. First, individual choice may in some cases provide illusory protection. Second, sometimes individual choices about privacy have negative externalities, so that it is the individual who benefits from the collection of personal information but others who, at least partially, bear the privacy costs. Third, an individual-choice model can sometimes overprotect privacy. These problems are outlined in further detail below and call into question strong assertions that derogations from individual consent must lead to derogations from privacy. In fact, if such derogations address these issues, then they could potentially lead to stronger privacy protection. As many of the concerns surrounding the new provincial privacy legislation in BC and Alberta focus on derogations from a consent model within the employment relationship, it is important to note that there are good reasons to question employee consent as a source of protection for employee interests. Employment contracts are one area where it is widely agreed that reliance upon freedom of contract will not protect employee interests. The differential bargaining power of employers and employees has led to a number of legal responses. Collective bargaining regimes are one such response to this power imbalance. Other responses that operate within the individual contractual paradigm include legislated employment standards that cannot be contracted out of, such as minimum-wage laws. Another significant feature of employment contracts is that they purport to regulate a relationship rather than a discrete transaction.
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Because it is difficult to specify in advance all the further details of this relationship, courts have been willing to import implied terms. Some of these are implied terms of fact, which purport to reflect the intentions of the parties. However, many are implied terms of law and are best understood as reflecting policy determinations as to what the employment relationship should look like. 32 Considerations arising out of our experience with employment contracts in general, therefore, counsel caution in accepting the proposition that a consent-based privacy regime will in fact protect individual interests, particularly within the context of relationships analogous to the employer-employee relationship. Moreover, the move toward implied terms of law suggests that a determination of privacy must reflect a sense of what is reasonable within a particular relationship and not a unilateral individual definition. This, in turn, reintroduces the definitional problem of privacy. Focusing on these two issues of relationship and bargaining power as they arise in the employment context can help to highlight deficiencies in the individual-choice model of privacy within the context of more traditional market transactions. Even if transactions do not take place within such a complex relationship as the employment relationship, some aspects of information collection, use, and disclosure may raise analogous issues. For example, in some contexts it is difficult to specify in advance all the ways in which personal information will be used, and so fairly general language may be resorted to. Even if the language is fairly specific, individuals may not fully appreciate the potential effects of some information practices, especially if they involve the storage and future use of information. Individual consent in such circumstances may be inadequate to fully protect individual interests. Furthermore, the personal information collected pursuant to any particular transaction may not be information to which an individual attaches a strong privacy interest. However, the cumulative effects of individual choices in many particular transactions with many different parties may result in a diminishment of privacy that is not desired by the individual. The effects of the aggregation of information are not well captured by a model that seeks to protect privacy at the level of individual transactions.
Another concern about an individual-choice model is that consumers, as individuals, do not have a great deal of bargaining power within the market. An individual consumer can usually only choose from what is offered on the market rather than negotiate for goods or services; what is offered depends on whether there are other consumers who are willing to pay for the goods or services. If enough people desire the same level of privacy protection as that individual, then the good or service will be offered in a manner that provides the desired level of privacy protection. In such a scenario, the individual's privacy interest may be protected through individual choice. However, if other people do not desire the same level of privacy protection, then the service in question may be offered only with undesirable privacy consequences, and the only choice available to the individual is between the service and his privacy. 33 An individual therefore has little recourse where her preferences differ from those of the majority of people. At best, she can pay more for this preference but cannot pay the same for services that impinge less upon her privacy. In other words, unless many individuals desire the 34 Examples of such 'searches' include the recent Holly Jones murder investigation in Toronto.
same high level of privacy, the choice may, in fact, not be offered in a manner that is meaningful to the individual. But unless a meaningful choice is presented to consumers, then the fact that consumers can consent to the choice presented does not necessarily protect privacy in any rigorous manner. It will definitely not protect privacy if that protection actually imposes any additional costs on a business beyond the costs of obtaining consent. The foregoing analysis also highlights one of the social aspects of privacy: the choices made by others can affect the choices available to any particular individual. Two other elements to this social dimension of privacy are important to mention. The first is that the choices made by other people may in fact provide others with indirect information about you. For example, this is how 'DNA dragnets' work in the context of investigations into some violent sexual crimes: police ask for voluntary DNA samples from individuals within a certain area in order to rule out potential suspects. 34 Numerous concerns arise out of this practice, including the validity of individual consent in such circumstances and the retention of the samples. However, another concern is that when large numbers of individuals do comply with such requests, those who refuse are singled out as suspects. In this way, personal information that is voluntarily provided by a number of people leads to the drawing of inferences about another individual. Within the context provided by the choices of others, individuals who refuse because of privacy concerns look as though they have something to hide. One could argue that, in such circumstances, an individual's right to refuse to consent in order to protect privacy in fact leads to the violation of privacy by singling out an individual for more intrusive surveillance. Consent, in such circumstances, does not provide meaningful privacy protection.
A second important social dimension of privacy arises out of the intersubjective nature of some information. An individual-choice model depends upon the idea that personal information is information that relates to that individual and over which that individual is entitled to exercise control. However, there are many kinds of information that may be about several individuals, and the model of individual control will be inadequate. Health information in general, and genetic information in particular, is often thought to have this feature. Individual consent in such circumstances will not be able to protect, and balance, all the interests at stake.
Finally, an individual-control model encounters conceptual problems when seeking to define the circumstances in which an individual is not to 36 be provided with control over personal information. As Anita Allen argues, 'in so many policy contexts it is wrong to insist on individual control over personal data.' 35 There are many circumstances in which others require access to personal information that an individual might nonetheless object to. Under an individual-choice model, we would expect to find exceptions to consent where there are strong reasons to suspect that individual choice would result in the wrong balance between privacy and competing values. Such cases would include those where the social interest in the collection of personal information directly conflicts with the individual's interest in such collection -for example, the lawenforcement context. In contrast, where the benefits of collection fall to the individual (e.g., additional service features), it would appear appropriate to allow the individual to determine whether those benefits outweigh any disadvantages to her privacy.
However, there are many cases that fall between these extremes and that call for adjudication between an individual's decision regarding the right balance between individual privacy -informed by that individual's conception of privacy as well as by her desired level of privacy -and the needs of others. This would seem to either reintroduce the conceptual problems of defining privacy or introduce the risk of an individual-choice model actually overprotecting privacy to the detriment of other important social values.
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These difficulties are apparent even in property-based articulations of personal information protection. For example, James Rule has argued that the commercial exploitation of personal information is best addressed through a proprietary right whereby all commercial uses of personal information must be subject to the explicit consent of the individual, who could also demand compensation for its collection and use. 37 However, he also indicates that the personal information 'deemed "functionally necessary" to initiate and sustain the individual's access to the service or product ... sought' may be collected without consent. 38 Once one grants, as Rule does, that a commercial entity collecting information should not have the sole discretion to determine what is 'functionally necessary' for the transaction, then an objective test must be developed. It is difficult to see how this could work without an appreciation and balancing of the costs and burdens of conducting a transaction in a more privacy-enhancing manner against the potential impact on an 39 Rule also accepts the idea that some 'sensitive data' should be removed from commercial exchange (ibid. at 224 individual's privacy. Not only is a balancing exercise inevitable, it also cries out for more nuanced understanding of privacy than one based on an assertion of a proprietary right of control.
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There are many reasons, therefore, to be sceptical of the claimed centrality of consent to the protection of privacy. Consent-based regimes of privacy protection rely upon an understanding of privacy either as control over personal information or as a matter of individual choice and definition. As the previous discussion has outlined, both approaches have serious defects that suggest that individual consent is not always necessary in order to provide adequate protection to individual privacy. This seems to be in direct contrast to much current rhetoric surrounding fair information practices, which suggests that consent is the central vehicle through which the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information are limited in a manner that protects privacy. However, the following discussion outlines how this rhetoric is not only in tension with the general theoretical concerns canvassed above but also with a number of articulations of fair information practices themselves. That is, even within the discourse of fair information practices one finds that consent is not the only norm operating to limit the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. Understanding this provides additional weight to the view that not all derogations from consent need be construed as derogations from the protection of privacy: privacy may be protected in other ways. III 
Consent and fair information practices
A OECD GUIDELINES Fair information practices find their most influential articulation in the 1980 OECD Privacy Guidelines, which adopted the following eight principles: Collection Limitation, Data Quality, Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, Openness, Individual Participation, and Accountability. 40 These principles still represent the international consensus regarding data protection and are considered minimum standards 'which are capable of being supplemented by additional measures for the protection of privacy and individual liberties. ' 41 Canada has been a signatory to them since 1984, and they have deeply informed the development of Canadian data protection law. 42 43 OECD Guidelines, supra note 40 at para. 7. 44 Ibid. at para. 52. 45 Ibid. at para. 9. 46 Ibid. at para. 10.
Consent plays an important role in a number of the principles outlined in the OECD Guidelines that seek to place limits on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. For example, the Collection Limitation Principle states that '[t]here should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.'
43 Therefore, the requirement of consent (where appropriate) helps to limit the collection of personal information. Of course, as the Collection Limitation Principle also states, there are circumstances in which consent is not appropriate. The 'Detailed Comments' section of the OECD Guidelines refers to '[c]riminal investigation activities and the routine up-dating of mailing lists' as examples of such situations. 44 Consent also figures in the principles that speak to the subsequent uses and disclosure of information. For example, the Purpose Specification Principle states,
The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose. 45 Additionally, the Use Limitation Principle states, 'Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with [the Purpose Specification Principle]' unless the 'data subject' consents to this use or it is authorized by law. 46 Taken together, what these principles require is that if information is to be used or disclosed in a manner inconsistent with the purposes for which it was collected, then consent is required, unless otherwise authorized by law. This is so even if the original collection of information did not require consent.
Although consent plays an important role in limiting the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information, it is important to note that it is not the only norm that plays such a role. As already indicated, the Purpose Specification Principle limits the use and disclosure of personal information to the purposes for which it was initially collected, even if that collection did not require consent. Furthermore, under the Data Quality Principle, the collection of information is limited to information that is relevant to the specified purposes: 'Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up- to-date.' 47 The normative force of this kind of limit does not necessarily depend upon consent. If I consent to collection for specified purposes, then one could argue that my consent is limited to information relevant to those purposes. However, the Data Quality Principle would limit information collection even in circumstances where consent is not required.
Apart from information collection, use, and disclosure being limited by notions of purpose and relevancy, there is another sense of limits that does not piggy-back upon the notion of consent: we may think that some kinds of information should be protected from collection even if an individual consents to such collection. That is, we may want to argue that some kinds of information should not be collected for some kinds of purposes. This is also reflected in the Collection Limitation Principle. The 'Detailed Comments' section of the OECD Guidelines states that the Collection Limitation Principle in fact deals with two issues:
(a) limits to the collection of data which, because of the manner in which they are to be processed, their nature, the context in which they are to be used or other circumstances, are regarded as specially sensitive; and (b) requirements concerning data collection methods. Different views are frequently put forward with respect to the first issue. It could be argued that it is both possible and desirable to enumerate types or categories of data which are per se sensitive and the collection of which should be restricted or even prohibited.… On the other hand, it may be held that no data are intrinsically 'private' or 'sensitive' but may become so in view of their context and use. 48 Because the Expert Group could not agree on sensitivity criteria, they instead had the Collection Limitation Principle include the concept of limits in general. 49 The reference to consent in the Collection Limitation Principle would therefore appear to fall under 'requirements concerning data collection methods' rather than 'limits to the collection of data' that are considered sensitive. In other words, the OECD Guidelines reflect the idea that norms independent of consent may operate to limit the collection of information considered 'specially sensitive.' principles instead of eight: Accountability, Identifying Purposes, Consent, Limiting Collection, Limiting Use, Disclosure and Retention, Accuracy, Safeguards, Openness, Individual Access, and Challenging Compliance.
The principles outlined in the CSA Code differ from those in the OECD Guidelines in a number of ways that are important to the issue of limiting the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. First, the minimum standard of 'knowledge or consent' except where inappropriate found in the OECD Guideline's Collection Limitation Principle becomes the potentially more robust standard of 'knowledge and consent' except where inappropriate in the CSA Code's principle of Consent. 51 Second, the Limiting Collection Principle of the CSA Code can also be seen to build upon the OECD Guideline's minimum standards. It states that '[t]he collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall be collected by fair and lawful means.' 52 While this copies the 'lawful and fair means' of the OECD Guideline's Collection Limitation Principle, it also shifts from a standard of relevance to purposes, as found in the OECD Guideline's Data Quality Principle, to a standard of necessity -which is potentially far more stringent.
Third, the normative basis for understanding limits to the collection of information shifts, in the CSA Code, almost entirely toward a consent model. That is, there is virtually no sense within the CSA Code that the collection of some information should be prohibited either because of its nature or because of the context of its collection. Instead, the 'sensitivity' of the information is to be taken into account when determining the type of consent required under the principle of Consent. As the CSA Code states,
The form of the consent sought by the organization may vary, depending upon the circumstances and the type of information. In determining the form of consent to use, organizations shall take into account the sensitivity of the information. Although some information (for example, medical records and income records) is almost always considered to be sensitive, any information can be sensitive, depending on the context. For example, the names and addresses of subscribers to a newsmagazine would generally not be considered sensitive information. However, the names and addresses of subscribers to some specialinterest magazines might be considered sensitive. Furthermore, when determining the form of consent, 'the reasonable expectations of the individual are also relevant.' 54 The choice of the CSA Code, therefore, was to incorporate the OECD concerns regarding 'specially sensitive' data into the consent provisions by ensuring that consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of such information be explicit. However, the CSA Code does not provide for any further limits to information collection beyond the protection offered by an individual's refusal to consent.
At tension with this move toward a consent model, although also included within the full statement of the principle of Consent, is the refusal-to-deal clause: 'An organization may not, as a condition of the supply of a product or service, require an individual to consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of information beyond that required to fulfil the explicitly specified, and legitimate purposes.' 55 The potential tension between this provision and the idea of consent lies in the word 'legitimate.' If this means that individuals may not consent to purposes deemed 'illegitimate,' then it is not clear why this statement is part of the full elucidation of the principle of Consent -it would more appropriately be labelled as a limitation on the principle of Consent. However, this interpretation is unpersuasive, given both the placement of the refusal-todeal clause in the Consent section of the CSA Code and the code's decision to protect 'sensitive' information through consent itself and not through some other idea of limitation. It is more likely that the idea of 'legitimate purposes' is meant to ensure that businesses cannot avoid the protections of the code simply by requiring consent to very broad purposes that may in fact contemplate information uses beyond those needed for the specific transaction in question. For example, a business may want to collect and use personal information for marketing purposes, even if that information is not needed to complete a transaction for services. This principle would require the business to treat these as two separate transactions, each requiring a separate consent.
C PIPEDA AND THE BRITISH COLUMBIA AND ALBERTA MODELS PIPEDA, in some senses, represents a departure from the OECD Guidelines in that it adopts the strengthened centrality of the consent provisions as provided for in the CSA Code. PIPEDA incorporates the CSA Code into its legislative structure: section 5(1) provides that, subject to a number of exemptions as outlined in the act, every organization is required to comply with the obligations of the CSA Code, as outlined in Schedule 1 of the act. Many of these exemptions deal with the question of when personal information may be collected, used, or disclosed without 57 Ibid. at s. 7(2)(a), (3)(c), (c.1), (c.2), (d). These provisions do raise the question of whether it is too easy for law enforcement agencies to get access to personal information and whether the Charter permits this. See Lisa M. Austin, 'One Step Forward,' supra note 21. 58 PIPEDA, supra note 1 at s. 7(2)(c) and (3)(f). 59 Some of these might be objectives pertaining to the individual's best interest rather than the broader social interest. For example, s. it is reasonable to expect that the collection with the knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise the availability or the accuracy of the information and the collection is reasonable for purposes related to investigating a breach of an agreement or a contravention of the laws of Canada or a province.
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There are similar provisions with respect to the use and disclosure of information without consent for law-enforcement purposes. 57 Other exemptions for use and disclosure without consent include purposes such as research.
58 Such exceptions to consent can be characterized as derogations from privacy in order to meet other important objectives. 59 However, in another sense PIPEDA represents a return to the OECD Guidelines by recognizing potential limits on the collection of information that are not determined, directly or indirectly, by reference to the notion of consent. Importantly, s. 5(3) provides that '[a]n organization may collect, use or disclose personal information only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the circumstances.' This last provision was added at the behest of privacy advocates concerned that organizations be required to justify their purposes for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. 60 In fact, when PIPEDA was originally introduced as Bill C-54 in 1998, it did not have this provision.
Both British Columbia's Personal Information Protection Act and Alberta's Personal Information Protection Act in many respects follow PIPEDA's consent model and, as stated earlier, have been deemed to be 'substantially similar.' 61 Although neither explicitly incorporates the CSA Code into its structure, both adopt its framework in many respects, as well as PIPEDA's general framework for limitations on consent. In addi-62 BC Act, supra note 4 at ss. 11, 14, 17; Alberta Act, supra note 4 at ss. 11, 16, 19. 63 BC Act, ibid. at s. 8(3). 64 Alberta Act, supra note 4 at s. 8. 65 This has been the experience with implied terms in contract law, which raise similar questions of whether the parties would have actually agreed to the terms or whether policy concerns operate to determine contractual obligations.
tion, both incorporate a general 'reasonable purpose' standard in addition to consent in order to limit the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.
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However, both the BC Act and the Alberta Act derogate from PIPEDA's consent model in a number of ways. First, as outlined earlier, both acts exempt the employment relationship from the consent provisions. However, the claim that this type of derogation from consent represents a derogation from privacy is not as clear as with the law-enforcement exemptions outlined above. Information collection, use, and disclosure within the employment relationship are still subject to the requirements of notification and reasonableness. If both the reasonableness provision and the consent provisions in PIPEDA are meant to act as limits to the collection, use, and disclosure of information, then it does not necessarily follow that a regime of no consent but reasonableness will not adequately protect privacy. What is needed is a better sense of the role that each plays with respect to the protection of privacy.
This relationship between consent and reasonable purposes is also at stake in the second way in which the BC and Alberta Acts depart from the PIPEDA consent model. Neither act follows PIPEDA's clear statements regarding the need for explicit consent with respect to sensitive information; instead, both outline the circumstances under which implicit consent will be found. For example, under the BC Act an individual is deemed to provide implicit consent where she has been notified about the purposes for collection, use, or disclosure and given the opportunity to decline and where 'the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is reasonable having regard to the sensitivity of the personal information in the circumstances.' 63 The Alberta Act has virtually identical provisions. 64 It is not clear that these provisions will result in greater reliance on implicit consent than under PIPEDA. However, given that many privacy advocates view implicit consent as a very weak version of consent that should be limited, this shift in emphasis could be construed as a derogation from PIPEDA's consent model. It is not difficult to see why: implicit or 'deemed' consent is far from the question of actual consent and shifts the focus from the particular individual to a more objective inquiry that can potentially import considerations that stray far from a consent analysis. 65 Nonetheless, the fact that implicit consent may only be found where a reasonableness standard has been met again raises the question about the relationship between reasonableness and consent. If privacy commissioner George Radwanski, who so severely criticized the British reasonableness can also protect privacy, then is a derogation from a standard of explicit consent (if that is the standard) that preserves a reasonableness standard necessarily a derogation from privacy?
The real question raised by the new BC and Alberta legislation, then, is the relationship between the role of consent and the role of a reasonable purpose standard in securing limitations on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information. If the reasonableness standard can be seen as a source of privacy protection, then it may not be the case that derogations from consent are necessarily derogations from privacy. This article has already suggested that individual consent is not necessarily a source of privacy protection, indicating that a test for 'reasonableness' could indeed provide a privacy-protective function, depending upon how a concern for privacy is built into such a test.
Part IV below outlines the decisions rendered under PIPEDA that have dealt with the relationship between reasonable purposes and consent and argues that these decisions, in fact, show that reasonableness takes conceptual primacy over consent. As will be discussed in more detail below, where individuals have been properly informed of the purposes for the collection, use, or disclosure of their personal information and these purposes have been found to be reasonable, a finding of consent follows. This holds true both within and outside the employment context. However, this then raises the question of how 'reasonableness' is to be determined in a manner that provides strong privacy protection. As will be discussed, the primacy of reasonableness over consent in practice suggests that the definitional difficulties plaguing other areas of privacy protection cannot be avoided in the context of fair information practices. If privacy is indeed to receive adequate levels of protection, such difficulties must be faced head-on rather than avoided through an over-reliance on consent that simply serves to obscure the role of 'reasonableness.' IV 
Decisions under PIPEDA: The priority of reasonableness over consent
A THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT PIPEDA applies to employees working in federally regulated industries. A number of employment decisions under PIPEDA have dealt with the relationship between the principle of consent and s. 5(3)'s requirement of reasonable purposes. An examination of these cases reveals that the reasonable purposes provision, in fact, deeply influences the consent analysis, such that consent does not play a significant role. In other words, the employment decisions under PIPEDA would be decided the same way under the BC and Alberta Acts, even though that legislation exempts the employment relationship from the requirement of consent. The first employment case under PIPEDA was ambiguous concerning the respective roles played by consent and reasonable purposes. The case dealt with an employee who, pursuant to PIPEDA, had requested access to her personal information held by her employer. The employer sent copies of its response to union representatives without the consent of the employee. 67 The commissioner agreed that there had been no implied consent to this disclosure to the union representatives and also indicated that under s. 5(3) 'he was satisfied that a reasonable person would have considered the disclosure to the union representatives to be unacceptable.' What is not clear is whether the commissioner's decision regarding lack of consent in fact followed upon his determination of lack of reasonableness. Another way to put this is to ask whether, if the disclosure had been found to be reasonable under s. 5(3), the commissioner would have found implied consent to the disclosure.
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While this initial employment case is unclear regarding the relationship between these questions, subsequent cases strongly suggest that a finding of implied consent follows a finding of reasonableness, making reasonable purposes rather than consent the primary consideration. Consider a more recent employee case. Two former operators at a telecommunications company complained that their employer had collected information about their work (the volume, duration, and type of calls received) without their consent and had used it to evaluate their job performance. 69 In evaluating this complaint, the commissioner dealt with s. 5(3) first and found that such collection and use was reasonable under s. 5(3), for 'it is appropriate for a company to monitor and evaluate the job performance of its employees and ... since, in this case, an operator's main function is to answer customer calls, it is likewise appropriate for statistical information about these calls to be used to measure job performance.' The evidence also showed that the employees were informed of these purposes. Turning to the principle of consent, he held that 'performance evaluation, an integral part of the employer-71 PIPED Act Case Summary # 127 (2003) . employee relationship, is a condition of employment to which the complainants gave implicit consent when they agreed to work for the company.' In this case, therefore, the determination of the consent issue appears to follow the determination of the reasonable purpose question, making reasonableness rather than consent the threshold issue.
This relationship, whereby consent is subordinated to reasonableness, is even more striking in a number of cases that appeared to invite a strong consent-based analysis and yet were determined almost solely according to the reasonableness provision. For example, a complaint was brought by thirty-five employees of a particular company who alleged that their employer was requiring them to consent to a security check and threatening them with loss of employment or reassignment to another division of the company if they did not consent. 70 The basis for the complaint was that consent under such circumstances could not be considered voluntary. The commissioner found that the complainants had a choice regarding whether or not to provide consent, and so the consent was voluntary, despite 'the potential for negative consequences.' He argued that the pressure felt by the employees did not amount to 'duress' and that the key question in the case was not consent but rather 'whether the collection itself was reasonable.' With respect to this latter question, the privacy commissioner found that the collection was reasonable. The security checks concerned the nuclear products division of the company in question, and that division required a licence from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) in order to produce nuclear fuel. In response to concerns regarding terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, the CNSC required the security checks in question as a condition of retaining a licence. The commissioner found that both CNSC's requirement for the collection of information and the company's compliance with this requirement were reasonable and that, because of this, the employees' complaint was not well founded. In this case, therefore, the analysis turned on the issue of reasonableness. The only opportunity for choice that consent provided to employees was the choice between accepting the collection of information and losing their jobs.
Similarly, a complaint was brought by an employee of a telecommunications company who alleged that his employer was forcing him to consent to a security check in order to work in a restricted area of an airport. 71 The privacy commissioner concluded that the complaint was not well founded, arguing the complainant had a choice with respect to whether to consent to the security check and that the fact that failing to comply with this requirement could result in job loss did not make his consent involuntary. Importantly, the commissioner 'noted the fact that consent is often not unfettered and that it must be looked at in the context of the reasonable person test in section 5(3).' In other words, the commissioner explicitly acknowledged that, for him, the protection offered through consent is intrinsically tied to the protection offered by reasonableness.
Even where the commissioner found an employer to be in violation of PIPEDA, he chose to do so under reasonable purposes rather than under consent. For example, a complaint was brought by a commercial airline pilot who was being asked to sign a form broadly authorizing the US government to obtain personal information as a condition of training on aircraft simulators in the United States. The commissioner held that this was unreasonable, even though the cost of alternative training in Europe was quite considerable. Influencing this decision was the fact that the US authorization form failed to meet the requirements of fair information principles and therefore was contrary to Canadian law. To be required to fulfil the request of a foreign government that was contrary to Canadian law when alternatives existed was unreasonable. 72 Similarly, an employee of a railway company complained to the privacy commissioner regarding the use of digital video surveillance cameras, which the company claimed were needed primarily to reduce vandalism, theft, and potential liability for property damage and to improve employee safety. 73 The complaint is reported to be a complaint about the collection of personal information without consent. However, it was determined solely under s. 5(3), whereby the use of the cameras was found to be unreasonable. The commissioner determined that there was no evidence of a real and specific problem, that it was not clear that the system was effective, and that the company had not considered less privacy-invasive alternatives.
Following an application to the Federal Court, the Court also determined the case primarily under s. 5(3). Lemieux J. disagreed with the privacy commissioner and held that the use of the video camera was reasonable.
74 Importantly, he also determined that the first question to answer was the question of reasonableness, and then the question regarding consent could be asked. However, he declined to answer the question of consent because '[t]he issue of implied consent was raised but not really argued.' 75 Instead, he found the collection of information to fall within s. 7(1)(b) of PIPEDA, which permits collection without consent where consent would compromise the availability of information for the purposes of an investigation.
The strong role played by s. 5(3) in influencing the issue of consent has even been explicitly confirmed in some decisions under PIPEDA. For example, the assistant privacy commissioner has recently stated that '[i]n considering the issue of consent with respect to a job requirement that impinges on privacy, the purposes for introducing the measure must be looked at in the context of the reasonable person test outlined in subsection 5(3).' 76 There is one recent decision in which the assistant privacy commissioner upheld the employer's information collection under s. 5(3) but held that the principle of consent was nonetheless violated. 77 The complainant did not want to consent to what he considered to be excessive claims by his employer for medical information. The assistant privacy commissioner held that the employer's purpose for collection was reasonable under s. 5(3) and found that the collection was limited to what was necessary for this purpose. However, she found that the principle of consent was violated when the employer sought some of this information directly from the complainant's specialist rather than requesting it from the complainant. In this way, this one case upholds the principle of consent as operating independently of s. 5(3). However, it is important to be clear regarding what the actual wrong was in the case. The complainant had no reason to object to the employer requiring the information but did have a reasonable objection to the manner in which it was collected. This is not necessarily upholding consent so much as upholding the idea that information should be collected directly from an individual and collected with that individual's knowledge.
In all of these decisions, therefore, consent plays little role outside of the fact that one is held to consent to the employment relationship. Most of the cases turn on the question of whether the purposes for collection are reasonable within that relationship. In other words, they all exhibit the structure adopted by the BC and Alberta Acts with respect to the employment relationship. In this context, then, derogations from consent are not necessarily derogations from privacy, given that consent plays no apparent role outside of the consent given to the general relationship. Even if these decisions had been made differently, the likely response of employers would have been to make the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information explicitly a part of the employment contract. Given the general experience with employment contracts, as discussed above, it is difficult to see how this would give employees more privacy protection than a finding that the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for reasonable employment purposes is an implied term of the employment contract.
Privacy protection in the employment context will come from a strong reading of reasonable purposes, not consent. Here, the concerns arising out of our experience with the reasonable expectation of privacy test are apposite. A reasonable purposes test will not protect employee privacy if it is strongly focused on employer interests rather than on employee privacy. The test cannot be whether, from the employer's perspective, the impugned practices make sense. That is, the reasonable purposes test should not simply weed out non-employment purposes from employment purposes. It must also inquire into the nature of the employee privacy interest at stake and the extent of the purported violation. Moreover, there must be some sense of an employer's obligation to accommodate employee privacy even if this imposes some burdens on the employer. The privacy commissioner's analysis in his decision regarding the airline pilot's complaint about US information practices comes closest to meeting the requirements of this kind of analysis, but many of the commissioner's other decisions are disappointingly thin. Part of the difficulty is likely that the former privacy commissioner operated explicitly with a definition of privacy as control over information. Such a definition does not lend itself to the kind of balancing analysis required under reasonable purposes and as a result, ironically, can potentially undermine privacy.
Finally, it is important to note the role that notification plays. The BC and Alberta Acts require employers to notify employees about information collection, use, and disclosure, and in the cases under PIPEDA discussed above this was never in question. Even if notification is not tied to consent, it is important in order to allow employees to contest the reasonableness of the information practices as well as to effectively exercise the rest of their rights under a fair information practices regime -including the ability to access personal information held about them as well as the right to correct inaccuracies.
B OUTSIDE THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
The foregoing analysis of the employment relationship raises a further question regarding the alleged centrality of consent to fair information practices more generally. If consent does not play a meaningful role in the employment context, is there any reason to think that this conclusion is limited to that context rather than signalling something of broader significance? Within the employment context, if an employee consents to the employment relationship and the information practices are known to the employees and considered reasonable within that relationship, then implicit consent is found. The question then is whether, outside such a complex relationship, a similar structure of analysis ensues. If so, one would expect that where an individual consents to a particular transaction for goods or services, knows about the information practices associ-78 One could withdraw consent, but then it is understood that one is withdrawing from the transaction -that is, cancelling the goods or services. 79 PIPED Act Case Summary #42 (2002). 80 Ibid. ated with that transaction, and considers such information practices to be reasonable, implicit consent would be found. That is, the result would be the same as if there was simply a notice and reasonableness regime.
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According to this analysis, consent would be required only in two types of cases. First, it would be required in those situations where the process of gaining explicit consent is important for ensuring that adequate notification actually occurs, so that the consent to the transaction in question is fully informed. Second, it would be required where the information collection, use, or disclosure itself amounts to a separate transaction rather than being tied to the initial transaction that was consented to.
One of the earliest cases under PIPEDA to demonstrate the purported strength of its consent provisions concerned Air Canada's use of 'opt-out' consent for its Aeroplan frequent flyer program. 79 After PIPEDA came into force, Air Canada distributed a brochure to some of its Aeroplan members outlining how their personal information was used in five different categories. Plan members were instructed to check off an opt-out box beside any of these categories if they did not consent to such use. Upon investigating a complaint brought by a number of plan members, the privacy commissioner determined that the use of opt-out consent in such circumstances violated the consent provisions of PIPEDA. The commissioner expressed concern about the potential, in each of the five information-sharing situations, for use and disclosure of information customized according to individual plan members' purchasing habits and preferences. He determined that information of this kind is sufficiently sensitive to warrant obtaining positive or 'opt-in' consent, as opposed to negative or 'opt-out' consent, from the individuals concerned. Although in the Commissioner's view the practice of using plan members' information for purposes of advertising products, services, and special promotions remains unobjectionable in itself, he was satisfied that a reasonable person would not expect such practice to extend to the 'tailoring' of information to the individual's potentially sensitive personal or professional interests, uses of or preferences for certain products and services, and financial status, without the positive consent of the individual.
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There are several points to note about this decision. First, the determination of whether consent is to be explicit or implicit makes reference to the expectations of a reasonable person. Second, part of what concerned the commissioner was the sensitivity of the professional and financial information involved, information that Air Canada collected from what it identified as 'external sources' in order to better target consumers as well as to determine their eligibility for certain financial products and services. According to the analysis outlined above, sensitive information might call for explicit consent in order to ensure adequate notification of its collection, use, and disclosure.
Third, it was the extension of the information collection, use, and disclosure past basic advertising and promotions and into targeted marketing that the commissioner determined required explicit consent. This also comports with the analysis offered above that explicit consent is required where the information collection, use, and disclosure are best characterized as a separate transaction. Here, consumers collect Aeroplan miles in order to redeem them for certain products and services. Therefore, some information practices must be seen to be an intrinsic part of being part of the plan, and if a consumer has knowledge of these practices and enrols in the plan, then he implicitly consents to these practices. However, to the extent that information practices go beyond those needed for the transaction, a separate consent is required. The basis for determining this important cut-off is not consent but reasonableness.
One of the strongest cases for illustrating the role of the consent provisions under PIPEDA can therefore be read as support for the proposition that the provisions of reasonableness and notification in fact do most of the work in protecting an individual's privacy. The case for such a interpretation of the primacy of reasonableness finds further support in an examination of the cases under PIPEDA that have quite explicitly dealt with the relationship between consent and reasonable purposes. If the application of the consent provisions in general under PIPEDA follow the same pattern as their application to the employment context, then we would expect to find that all the cases that pass scrutiny under the reasonableness standard of s. 5(3) also pass scrutiny under the principle of consent. If, on the contrary, the consent provisions do some independent normative work, than we would expect to find some cases where, despite passing s. 5(3) scrutiny, the collection, use, or disclosure of information violates the consent provisions of the act. In fact, there are a few cases that exhibit the latter structure. However, a close examination of them suggests that, rather than confirming the significance of consent, they in fact repeat the basic structure exhibited by the employment cases. In other words, consent does not appear to play the central role often claimed for it.
There are two very similar cases that exhibit the general structure of passing s. 5(3) scrutiny but failing under Principle 4.3; on closer examination, both appear to be about the failure of notification rather than the failure of consent itself.
The first case exhibiting this pattern of complaint dealt with an individual who, in the course of seeking to have his cable service discon-81 PIPED Act Case Summary #152 (2003) . There were other elements to the complaint as well, but only this aspect of the complaint exhibits the structure outlined. 82 For this reason, the cable provider also contravened principle 4.2.3, which requires that '[t]he identified purposes should be specified at or before the time of collection to the individual from whom the personal information is collected.' 83 PIPED Act Case Summary #24 (2001). 84 Under CRTC regulations, the provision of telephone services is seen as an extension of credit. 85 For this reason, the telephone company also was found to be in violation of Principle 4.2.3.
nected, was asked to provide his new address as well as his reasons for changing cable providers. 81 When the individual asked why the cable company required this information, he was told that it was needed to 'fill in the screen.' The privacy commissioner found that this was not the reason and that the individual should have been told that he was not required to provide the information. As a result, the cable company was found to have contravened Principle 4.3.2. Principle 4.3.2, as a subsection of the general principle of consent, refers to the requirement of notice and consent. However, the privacy commissioner also found that collecting the individual's address as well as his reason for terminating service was something 'a reasonable person would view ... to be legitimate and in accordance with section 5(3).'
82 The commissioner's finding, therefore, turned on the lack of notification of the true (and reasonable) purposes rather than a lack of consent per se. If the cable company had provided such notification, then it does not appear that the privacy commissioner would have found a violation of Principle 4.3.2. In other words, his reasoning would have conformed to the pattern in the employment cases, where a finding of implied consent followed a finding of reasonable purposes.
A second case dealing with reasonable purposes under s. 5(3) but a lack of consent under Principle 4.3.2 is also best characterized as a case about notice rather than consent. In this case, an individual was required to provide either two pieces of identification or a deposit in order to obtain telephone services. 83 She was told that the purpose of the identification was to 'confirm her identity.' However, upon investigation, the privacy commissioner found that the true purpose of such collection in the case of new customers was in fact to run a credit check on the applicant. 84 While the commissioner found this purpose to be reasonable under s. 5(3), he found that the telephone company had nonetheless violated Principle 4.3.2 because 'a reasonable person would conclude that the company did not explicitly state the purpose for its collection of personal information with respect to first-time subscribers.' 85 In other words, the case turned on the question of notice; if the telephone company had informed the individual of the true (and reasonable) purposes for the collection of her information, then there would have been no violation of the consent provisions.
What these cases suggest is that if a consumer is notified about the purposes for the collection of the personal information in question, if these purposes are reasonable, and if the individual chooses to obtain services, then she implicitly consents to the collection of information. However, there is one PIPEDA decision in which s. 5(3) is satisfied but Principle 4.3 is violated that cannot be so easily explained as a case about notification rather than consent. This case involved an application for long-distance services from a telecommunications company. 86 When the complainant filled out his application form, he clearly indicated that he did not authorize a credit check. A company representative suggested to him that in order to avoid a credit check, he should opt for a pre-authorized payment plan, and the complainant did so. However, the company still did a credit check, arguing that 'this procedure was mandatory to obtain services, as it serves to verify the credit standing and ensure the financial capacity of the new subscriber.' The privacy commissioner held that, although the credit check was reasonable, it was contrary to 'the individual's clear wishes opposing a credit check' and therefore violated Principle 4.3. This case therefore provides a stronger example of the role that consent may play, independent of an inquiry into reasonableness.
One might still argue that the real problem in the case was the misrepresentation to the individual that the pre-authorized payment plan did not involve a credit check, and so the case is really best understood as a case about a failure of notification. More importantly, however, this case does not really answer the question of whether the telecommunications company is permitted, under PIPEDA, to offer only services that are tied to a credit check. While the commissioner was drafting his findings, the company informed him that it changed its policy to allow for the option of a pre-authorized payment plan in order to avoid a credit check. But if the choice, prior to the official change in policy, had been accurately put to the individual -services with a credit check or no serviceswould the company have been in violation of PIPEDA, given that the individual did not wish to consent to a credit check? The privacy commissioner's finding that the credit check was 'reasonable' even in the context of a pre-authorized payment plan suggests that no violation of PIPEDA would have been found in such circumstances and that this finding would have been determined by reasonableness rather than consent.
C REASONABLENESS AND THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
As the previous discussion highlights, the analysis of reasonable purposes in fact drives the analysis of consent in decisions under PIPEDA; where the 88 Rule proposes something similar when he argues that explicit consent should always be required unless the information collection is 'functionally necessary.' Rule, 'Toward Strong Privacy,' supra note 37 at 185-6. I disagree with his proposal for many of the reasons outlined here. Another option for determining when information practices constitute a separate transaction, requiring a separate consent, would be to reinvigorate the so-called refusal-to-deal provisions. As outlined earlier, under the CSA Code and PIPEDA, a business cannot refuse the provision of services to an individual who refuses to consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information beyond what is necessary to fulfil the purposes of the collection, use, and disclosure. 87 One could therefore argue that this provision is best suited to drawing the line between information collection that is properly tied to one transaction and information collection that is best construed as a separate transaction.
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There are two problems with this approach. The first is that it is not really a balancing test, and the concern is that it would not be interpreted in a manner recognizing that business needs must be balanced against privacy and that businesses might in fact have a burden to change the way in which they provide goods and services in order to be more privacy friendly. The second is that a finding of necessity really depends on the construal of the purposes. For example, a credit check is necessary for many types of billing options but may not be necessary when considered in light of the broader purpose of payment for services. The question of whether alternative options should be made available seems better asked under reasonable purposes, because this is more clearly a balancing test and targets the construal of the purposes directly. The question, then, is how to ensure that the determination of reasonable purposes protects privacy rather than simply serving as a vehicle through which to override privacy in the name of other competing interests. One of the problems resulting from an over-emphasis on the notion of consent as the central vehicle through which to protect privacy is that a robust reasonable purposes test has not been developed. This can be seen by returning to the issue of credit checks and payment plans in relation to subscribing to certain kinds of services.
A number of cases that deal with complaints about the collection of personal information needed to facilitate a credit check involve situations where an alternative payment plan is in fact available to consumers. 89 The availability of such an option informs the privacy commissioner's findings regarding consent and reasonable purposes. However, consider an earlier case, in which an individual complained because she was able to obtain the services in question only if she agreed to one of two automatic payment options, the first involving providing information about her bank account and the second involving providing information about her credit card. 90 She requested a third option: payment by certified cheque in advance. The company in question refused this request, arguing that they allowed such pre-payments only for more expensive combined service packages because of the cost of processing the cheques. The division in question was found not to have a billing system capable of administering such a payment option and only offered it with their combined services package because of an arrangement they had with another division. On these facts, the commissioner held that the company was in compliance with s. 5(3) because 'a reasonable person would consider the processing of payments for service to be an appropriate purpose for the collection and would expect the organization to determine its own billing options.' 91 This case is striking because the privacy commissioner never asked whether the organization should have to provide a pre-payment option for the same services that did not require providing so much personal information. It is not clear why an organization should be able to determine its own billing options without taking into account the need to provide privacy-protective options or providing evidence as to why it could not do so. Perhaps the privacy commissioner was concerned not to place an undue burden on businesses to change their billing systems in order to accommodate the desires of a minority of individuals. However, if PIPEDA is to be a privacy-protective regime and not simply an enabler of electronic commerce, then it should require an organization to make privacy-protective choices available to individuals, even if these choices do not represent the most cost-effective business practices possible. And this requires a robust reasonableness test that gives greater weight to the privacy interest at stake and requires evidence as to why a more minimally intrusive option would place too heavy a burden on the business in question.
Another important issue that this case highlights is how important it is to place privacy obligations on companies prior to the setting up, or upgrading, of information systems. Because contemporary informationprocessing systems, including billing systems, rely on information technology that is often expensive to set up and costly to change once set up, many decisions with important privacy implications are made before an individual is presented with any choices regarding services and transactions. Paying attention to how such systems are configured and the ways in which they enhance or further erode privacy is crucial. Indeed, this concern echoes one of Larry Lessig's central claims in his influential analysis of the Internet: 'Code is law.' 92 That is, once built, the architecture of cyberspace -the software and hardware that make it what it is -helps to shape the kind of interactions that may take place there. Regulating interactions after the important architectural decisions have been made fails to see the important value choices that, either deliberately or inadvertently, are built into the technology. Technologies and the specific value choices embedded in them come to function as a kind of legislation created outside our normal political and legal institutions and potentially quite difficult to alter after the fact. Similarly, a focus on the choices that a business makes available after their information systems have been set up fails to appreciate the need to require that privacy values be built into these systems from the outset.
What this might mean concretely is a far greater emphasis on the ability to engage in anonymous transactions or pre-payment plans than is currently the norm. Privacy advocates such as Roger Clarke have argued that ensuring anonymity is one of the most important emerging privacy challenges of the twenty-first century and have expressed scepticism regarding the ability of fair information practices to meet this challenge without substantial revision. 93 What this article suggests is that recognizing the work that 'reasonable purpose' does in legislation like PIPEDA and ensuring that it does in fact provide a robust protection for privacy, rather than an excuse for its erosion, is the most promising way to address these more systemic concerns.
What, then, should a test for 'reasonable purposes' look like? The most promising test to emerge from the decisions of the privacy commissioner, and one recently endorsed by the Federal Court in Eastmond, asks four questions:
Is the measure demonstrably necessary to meet a specific need? Is it likely to be effective in meeting that need? Is the loss of privacy proportional to the benefit gained? Is there a less privacy-invasive way of achieving the same end? 94 These questions, particularly the last, seem well suited to address a number of the concerns that have emerged in this discussion. In particular, businesses should have to provide evidence as to why services cannot be provided in other, more minimally intrusive ways. However, this test will not adequately protect privacy unless it includes, as a first step, an inquiry into the nature and extent of the privacy interest at stake. Without this, the test looks like a kind of orphaned Oakes test from Charter jurisprudence -defining when a right might be limited but missing the important initial step of defining the right in question and the manner in which it is being violated. Because of this, the danger is that this test for reasonable purposes will become a test for limiting privacy rather than enhancing it. To counter this danger, what is needed is a return to the very difficult questions involved in defining privacy and its value. In other words, fair information practices must grapple with, rather than avoid, the same challenges facing other regimes of privacy protection, such as constitutional law. V 
Conclusions
An examination of the decisions under PIPEDA indicates that 'reasonable purposes' plays a large analytic role in PIPEDA'a articulation of fair information practices and, in fact, often drives the analysis of consent. The PIPEDA cases that deal with the relationship between consent and reasonable purposes reveal that consent is important in terms of consenting to the general transaction or relationship in question. Notification provisions ensure that this consent is informed in the sense of alerting the individual to the informational consequences attached to the transaction or relationship. A separate consent to the information practices is important only where this might be necessary to ensure that proper notification occurred or where the information collection in question is better understood to form a separate transaction requiring its own consent rather than as part of the initial transaction. In this sense, consent can still safeguard some dimensions of choice. However, the question of whether the information collection, use, or disclosure is appropriate within the particular transaction or relationship is dealt with under the reasonable purposes provision rather than under consent. It is reasonable purposes, therefore, that holds out the promise of requiring meaningful choices to be presented to consumers. It is reasonable purposes that has the most potential for providing a high degree of privacy protection. Therefore, derogations from consent that nonetheless preserve notification and reasonable purposes do not necessarily represent derogations from privacy.
What this further suggests, however, is that much more attention needs to be paid to the interpretation of reasonable purposes so that it may fulfil its potential by providing strong privacy protection. This requires a return to the definitional difficulties that regularly surface in other regimes of privacy protection and an attempt to provide a workable understanding of privacy and its value, especially in the context of emerging technologies. To evade this responsibility through an overemphasis on the value of individual consent is to provide inadequate and highly illusory protection for privacy.
